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THE CASE FOR PROACTIVE MANAGEMENTBASED REGULATION TO IMPROVE
PROFESSIONAL SELF-REGULATION
FOR U.S. LAWYERS
Ted Schneyer*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The ABA Journal reported in November 2012 that the
Association's Standing Committee on Professional Discipline
("Standing Committee") was embarking on the first comprehensive
review of the American Bar Association's ("ABA") Model Rules for
Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement' in twenty years.2 This came on the
heels of a lengthy review of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ("Model Rules"), 3 which led to recent amendments in
response to the globalization of law practice and developments in law
practice technology.4
This Journal article aptly called these two sets of model rules the
"bookends" of the guidance the ABA provides to help the state supreme
courts structure their "professional conduct systems for lawyers." 5 Both
sets have been influential, which may explain why lawyers continue to
* Milton 0. Riepe Professor Emeritus University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of
Law. Thanks to Susan Fortney and Bruce Green for their comments on an early draft of this Article.
1. MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (2007).

2. James Podgers, A New Look: ABA Plans First Comprehensive Review of Disciplinary
Enforcement Rules in 20 Years, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2012, at 24, 24 [hereinafter Podgers, A New Look].
These rules provide a framework for investigating and prosecuting complaints alleging lawyer
misconduct. Id.
3.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2012).

4. Podgers, A New Look, supra note 2, at 24. This review was conducted by the ABA
Commission on Ethics 20/20, which ABA President Carolyn Lamm appointed in August 2009. See
James Podgers, Firm Handfor Hard Times: Incoming ABA PresidentCarolyn Lamm Seeks Aidfor
Lawyers FacingEconomic Woes, A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 2009, at 63, 64. The Commission, of which I was
a member, completed its work in February 2013, when the ABA House of Delegates adopted its
final four proposals for amending the Model Rules. See Leigh Jones, ABA Ethics Commission
Closes Chapter on Rule Revisions, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 14, 2013, http://www.law.com/jsp/
nlj.PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202588381157&ABA+ethicscommissioncloses chapteron rule revi
sions&slreturn=20130121155944.
5. Podgers, A New Look, supra note 2, at 24.
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refer to them as professional self-regulation ("PSR"). In PSR, the courts
adopt a code of professional conduct based heavily on the ABA rules in
order to govern the lawyers practicing in their jurisdictions.6 To ensure
compliance with those codes, the courts authorize a state bar or judicial
agency to receive and process complaints charging lawyers with
misconduct. And the courts and their agencies impose discipline,
ranging from private warnings to disbarment, on lawyers whom they
find to have breached code rules.8
But although professional discipline has been PSR's chief
regulatory approach to promoting ethics compliance, it is not the only
imaginable approach, and new developments in law practice and
regulatory technique are putting the adequacy of disciplinary

enforcement in question. For one thing, the disciplinary process has
always been reactive, ordinarily triggered only when clients (or others)
file complaints alleging lawyer misconduct. 9 But other common law
countries, while retaining a disciplinary process, are developing a
complementary approach that is proactive and not complaints-based.' °
For another, PSR's rules of professional conduct and disciplinary
proceedings still focus almost exclusively on the individual lawyer,"
despite the important role that law firm management has come to play in
promoting ethical compliance. But regulation in other common law
countries has begun to focus as well on law firms and firm management.
And finally, with its emphasis on regulation by discipline, PSR has done
6. Ted Schneyer, On Further Reflection. How "Professional Self-Regulation" Should
Promote Compliance with Broad Ethical Duties of Law Firm Management, 53 ARiz. L. REv. 577,
578 & n.3 (2011) [hereinafter Schneyer, On Further Reflection]. Until recently, the courts asserted
disciplinary jurisdiction only over lawyers licensed to practice in their state. In 2002, however, the
ABA amended the Model Rules to provide that "[a] lawyer not admitted in this jurisdiction is also
subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer provides or offers to provide
any legal services in this jurisdiction." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.5(a) (2012);
cf MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 6.A. (2007). Many states, but not
all, have followed suit. See STEPHEN GILLERS ET AL., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND

STANDARDS 516-19 (2010).
7. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS §§ 2.2, 2.6, 3.2 (1986) (providing
an overview of PSR's history and structure).
8. See id. §§ 3.2-.3.
9. Ted Schneyer, Thoughts on the Compatibilityof Recent U.K. andAustralian Reforms with
U.S. Traditions in Regulating Law Practice,2009 J. PROF. LAW. 13, 21 [hereinafter Schneyer,
Thoughts on Compatibility].
10. Idat30-31.
11. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Where Is the "'QualityMovement" in Law Practice?, 2012
Wis. L. REv. 387, 403 & n.33 (pointing out that, until recently, "professional responsibility doctrine
treated lawyers as solitary individuals concerned only with their own conduct"). Milton Regan sees
a connection between a regulatory focus on the individual lawyer and a pattern of American lawyers
seeking "to guard their individual independence, notwithstanding the increasingly collective and
interdependent nature of their practices." Milton C. Regan, Jr., Risky Business, 94 GEO. L.J. 1957,
1958 (2006).
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relatively little to protect clients from what is sometimes called
"unsatisfactory professional conduct" ("UPC") as opposed to "serious
professional misconduct." Only the latter entails material violations of
ethics rules or other law." But regulators in other common law countries
now have considerably more to offer by way of consumer protection.
3
They work to deter UPC no less than more serious misconduct.'
Given these and other developments, limiting the Standing
Committee's mission to reviewing the rules of disciplinary procedure is
too narrow. With its task so defined, the Standing Committee would
have no reason to consider the developments abroad, or, for that matter,
recent developments in the regulation of U.S. lawyers and in regulatory
theory generally.' 4 In view of these developments, the committee should
also consider whether PSR can be strengthened at manageable cost by
adopting a regulatory program5 that I will call Proactive ManagementBased Regulation ("PMBR").1
Fortunately, there are early indications that PMBR is on the
Standing Committee's agenda. 16 That is the predicate for this Article,
which argues that the ABA should recommend, and the state courts7
should adopt, PMBR programs to supplement professional discipline.'
The Article presents evidence that PMBR programs both improve legal
services by increasing compliance with lawyers' legal and ethical
obligations and help sole practitioners and small firms, in particular, to
improve their operations.' Adopting PMBR should reduce the volume
of complaints filed with disciplinary authorities, thereby reducing
disciplinary costs and heightening public perceptions of PSR's
efficacy. 19 Heightening those perceptions is no small thing in an era

12. Schneyer, Thoughts on Compatibility,supra note 9, at 28-29.
13. See id at 28-30. UPC is further defined infra note 40.
14. In my view, the ABA, in studying and debating issues of lawyer regulation, has too often
relied on parochial rhetorical claims rather than empirical evidence and regulatory theory. See, e.g.,
Ted Schneyer, Policymaking and the Perils of Professionalism: The ABA's Ancillary Business
Debate as a Case Study, 35 ARIZ. L. REv. 363, 390-91 (1993); Ted Schneyer, "Professionalism"as
Pathology: The ABA's Latest Policy Debate on Nonlawyer Ownership of Law PracticeEntities, 40
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 75, 95 (2012). For a penetrating critique of ABA policymaking in this respect
and suggestions for improvement, see Stephen Gillers, How to Make Rules for Lawyers: The
ProfessionalResponsibility of the Legal Profession, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 365, 377-418 (2013).
15. See Schneyer, On FurtherReflection, supra note 6, at 619-20.
16. Email from Ellyn Rosen, Senior Counsel, ABA Ctr. for Prof'l Responsibility, to author
(Feb. 25, 2013) (on file with Hofstra Law Review).
17. I have supported adoption of PMBR programs in the United States in two previous
articles. Schneyer, On Further Reflection, supra note 6, at 619-27; Schneyer, Thoughts on
Compatibility,supra note 9, at 30-37.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part Ill.
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when lawyers are increasingly subject to unwelcome external
regulation,2 ° which may reflect weaknesses in PSR.21
The Article proceeds as follows. To convey a sense of how a fullbodied PMBR program is structured and what it can accomplish, Part II
discusses in detail the prototypical program that became fully
operational in New South Wales ("NSW"), Australia in 2004.22 Part II.A
describes the program, highlighting two features.23 The first is a
requirement that law practice entities organized as "incorporated legal
practices" ("ILPs"),24 designate one or more of their licensed solicitors
as "Legal Practitioner Directors," who are personally responsible for
assessing and maintaining their firm's "ethical infrastructure" 2 5-that is,
20. See, e.g., Jack R. Bierig, Whatever Happened to ProfessionalSelf-Regulation?, 69 A.B.A.
J. 616, 617 (1983) (arguing that the bar should be permitted to continue to set its own standards);
Martha Middleton, FTCKeep Out: Let Courts Control, House Says, 69 A.B.A. J. 1366, 1366 (1983)
(noting the ABA's ongoing lobbying campaign to exempt lawyers from regulation under federal
consumer protection laws on the ground that ethics rules adopted by state supreme courts and
enforced through professional discipline already regulate lawyers' business practices); see also Am.
Bar Ass'n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 471 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding ABA's challenge to FTC's
position that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act authorized the agency to regulate law firms as "financial
institutions" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Evidence suggests that on a global level the
primacy of professional self-regulation is losing ground to legislative and executive branch
oversight. See Laurel S. Terry, Steve Mark & Tahlia Gordon, Trends and Challenges in Lawyer
Regulation: The Impact of Globalization and Technology, 80 FORDHAM L. REv. 2661, 2667-74
(2012) (providing examples of this trend).
21. For one federal regulator's vote of no confidence in the state supreme courts' disciplinary
systems, see Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Remarks Before the Annual Meeting of
the American Bar Association's Business Law Section (Aug. 12, 2002) (stating that Chairman Pitt
was "not impressed, or pleased, by the generally low level of effective responses we receive from
state bar committees when we refer possible disciplinary proceedings to them"). For an argument
that regulating law firms, and regulating them proactively, will enhance public acceptance of
professional self-regulation for lawyers, see Adam M. Dodek, RegulatingLaw Firms in Canada, 90
CANADIAN B. REv. 383,433-39 (2012).
22. See infra Part H.
23. See infra Part N.A.
24. Schneyer, Thoughts on Compatibility,supra note 9, at 30-31. Australians often refer to
"law practices" rather than law firms because they need a term that is broad enough to cover not
only traditional law firms, but also firms owned in whole or in part by outside investors, as well as
multidisciplinary practices in which lawyers and nonlawyers practice their respective professions,
have an ownership interest, and share legal fees. See id. The Model Rules use the term "firm" or
"law firm" to refer to "a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole
proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal
services organization or the law department of a corporation or other organization." MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(c) (2012) (intemal quotation marks omitted). This Article takes no
position on whether PMBR programs can or should regulate law practice in settings other than
private law firms.
25. See Ted Schneyer, ProfessionalDisciplinefor Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10
(1991) [hereinafter Schneyer, Disciplinefor Law Firms] (stating that "a law firm's organization,
policies, and operating procedures constitute an 'ethical infrastructure' that cuts across particular
lawyers and tasks," and that ethical infrastructures "may have at least as much to do
with ... avoiding" misconduct in law firms as the individual values and skills of their lawyers). I
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policies, procedures, and systems designed to prevent common sorts of
errors and ethical violations. The second is non-adversarial
collaboration between regulators and the designated solicitors to help
firms develop and maintain "appropriate management systems. ' '26 Here,
the regulators play a role akin to that of consultants advising on how to
manage ethical risks.27 Part II.B examines two empirical studies of the
NSW program, which show, respectively, that the program has
dramatically reduced complaints against lawyers practicing in ILPs and
the designated solicitors have generally come to accept the program and
recognize its value in upgrading their operations.2 8 Part II.C presents
evidence that program costs have been modest and proportionate to
program benefits.29
Whether our state supreme courts, working in tandem with the bar,
should build a NSW-style PMBR program into their regulatory
framework depends, of course, on what the program could add at what
cost and whether it would complement, rather than weaken, the
disciplinary process. With that in mind, Part III looks at fairly recent
developments in PSR and ideas about how PSR can better promote
compliance with ethical norms.3 ° Part III.A points out that the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct now recognize the importance of law
firm management in promoting ethics compliance and competent
lawyering.31 Part III.B argues, however, that there is a serious mismatch
between the rules that establish broad ethical duties of law firm
management and the ABA's apparent assumption that those duties can
be adequately enforced in the disciplinary process.32 Part III.C shows
that PSR has already taken some steps in the direction of proactive
regulation, and that adopting a PMBR-style program would be an
incremental reform rather than a regulatory sea change.3 3 And Part III.D
coined the term "ethical infrastructure," but it is now in common use. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss
& David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for
Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REv. 691, 692 & n.7 (2002); John Chu, Ethics Auditing:
Should It Be Part of Large Law Firms' Ethical Infrastructure?, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 16, 19 (2008);
Alex B. Long, Whistleblowing Attorneys and Ethical Infrastructures, 68 MD. L. REv. 786, 791
(2009); Christine Parker et al., The Ethical Infrastructureof Legal Practice in Larger Law Firms:
Values, Policy and Behaviour, 31 U. N.S.W. L.J. 158, 160 & n.5 (2008).
26. Christine Parker, Tahlia Gordon & Steve Mark, Regulating Law Firm Ethics
Management: An EmpiricalAssessment of an Innovation in Regulation of the Legal Profession in
New South Wales, J.L. & Soc'Y 466,471 (2010) [hereinafter Parker, Gordon & Mark, An Empirical
Assessment].
27. Id. at 473.
28. See infra Part H.B.
29. See infra Part H.C.
30. See infra Part Hl.
31. See infra Part III.A.
32. See infra Part IB.
33. See infra Part HI.C.
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argues that PSR's limited commitment to consumer protection for
clients should be strengthened,
but that doing so may be impossible
34
without a PMBR program.
Recognizing that PMBR is a little known form of regulation in the
United States and that American lawyers and judges prize PSR for its
adherence to tradition, I conclude in Part IV by recapping the case for
importing NSW-style PMBR to the United States, if not lock, stock, and
barrel, then at least in part, as an experiment.35
II. THE ELEMENTS AND IMPACT OF36
THE NEW SOUTH WALES PROGRAM
A.

The ProgramDescribed

By 2004, solicitors in NSW were permitted to work in firms
organized as limited liability entities or ILPs.37 ILPs may be

34. See infra PartlI.D.
35. See infra Part IV.
36. Part II draws on portions of two earlier articles. See Schneyer, On Further Reflection,
supra note 6, at 619-27; Schneyer, Thoughts on Compatibility, supranote 9, at 30-37. In addition,
there is now a large body of scholarship on the NSW program. See Susan Fortney & Tahlia Gordon,
Adopting Law Firm Management Systems to Survive and Thrive: A Study of the Australian
Approach to Management-Based Regulation, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 152, 156 (2012) [hereinafter
Fortney & Gordon, Australian Approach]; Steven Mark & Georgina Cowdroy, IncorporatedLegal
Practices-A New Era in the Provision of Legal Services in the State of New South Wales, 22 PENN
ST. INT'L L. REv. 671, 688 (2004); Steven Mark & Tahlia Gordon, Innovation in RegulationResponding to a ChangingLegal Services Market, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 505-06 (2009);
Parker, Gordon & Mark, An Empirical Assessment, supra note 26, at 471. Other Australian
jurisdictions now have PMBR programs more or less like the one in NSW. See, e.g., John Briton &
Scott McLean, IncorporatedLegal Practices:Draggingthe Regulation of the Legal Profession into
the Modem Era, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 241, 244-50 (2008) (describing a similar program in
Queensland).
37. Legal Profession (IncorporatedLegal Practices) ACT 2000 (NSW) sch 1, pt 3, div
2A(47C)(1)-(2) (Austl.). As of February 2010, there were 902 ILPs in NSW, representing about
twenty percent of the law firms and of the roughly 25,000 lawyers then practicing in the state.
Memorandum from Esther Bedggood to Steve Mark, Comm'r, Office of Legal Servs. Comm'r (Feb.
15, 2010) (on file with Hofstra Law Review). The ILPs tended to be quite small, as are most law
firms in the state. See id. They included 685 solo practices, 137 firms with 2 principals, 40 with 3,
and 34 with 4 or more. Id. Two ILPs were law firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange; 58
were MDPs. Id. The largest ILP had 32 principals. Id. By 2009, many other NSW firms had
expressed interest in becoming ILPs. See generally Steve Mark, Views from an Australian
Regulator, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 45 [hereinafter Mark, Australian Regulator] (discussing the process
of firms incorporating in NSW). Largely for tax reasons, the large law firms in Sydney, the biggest
city in NSW, have not become ILPs. See Parker, Gordon & Mark, An EmpiricalAssessment, supra
note 26, at 481 n.52. However, new firms in Australia do tend to incorporate, and in 2010, a
national task force proposed that the proactive regulatory program for ILPs be extended to include
all law practices. See Andrew Grech, IncorporationNo Threat to Standards, AUSTRALIAN, July 9,
2010, at 29. Regulators in NSW are interested in extending their PMBR program to law practices
other than ILPs, but have not yet done so. Email from Tahlia Gordon, Research & Projects
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multidisciplinary practices ("MDPs"), may be owned in whole or in part
by outside investors, and may even raise capital by listing on the public
stock exchange.3 8 Concerned that ILPs might pose greater ethical risks
than traditional law firms, which are general partnerships and solely
owned by lawyers,39 Steve Mark, NSW's first Legal Services
Commissioner, ° looked to ILP management to provide safeguards. He

Manager, Office of Legal Servs. Comm'r, to author (Dec. 12, 2010) (on file with Hofstra Law
Review).
38. Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW) pt 2.6 (Austl.). In 2007, Slater & Gordon, chiefly a
plaintiffs' personal injury firm, became the first law firm in the world to list. See generally Andrew
Grech & Kirsten Morrison, Slater & Gordon: The Listing Experience, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
535 (2009) (examining Slater & Gordon's restructuring as a listed company).
39. For a comparative study of regulatory responses to the ethical risks that law practice in
limited liability entities is sometimes thought to create, see Susan Saab Fortney, Tales of Two
Regimes for Regulating Limited Liability Law Firms in the U.S. and Australia: Client Protection
and Risk Management Lessons, 11 LEGAL ETHICS 230, 233-34 (2008). The purpose of requiring
ILPs in NSW to implement ethics management systems was "to counter any increased commercial
pressure on the ethics of legal practice within ILPs." Parker, Gordon & Mark, An Empirical
Assessment, supranote 26, at 475.
40. Mr. Mark stepped down in August 2013. As in other Australian states, the NSW
legislature created a legal services commissioner who reports to the state attorney general. Legal
Profession Act 2004 (NSW) pt 7.3 (Austl.). The relationship between the Office of the Legal
Services Commissioner ("OLSC") and the NSW Law Society and Bar Association is described as
"co-regulation." See CHRISTINE PARKER & ADRIAN EvANs, INSIDE LAWYERS' ETHICS 54-56
(2007). With respect to discipline, all complaints against NSW barristers and solicitors go first to
the OLSC, which refers complaints alleging serious professional misconduct to the Bar or NSW
Law Society for investigation and possible prosecution. See id However, many complaints charge
lawyers with what Australians call "unsatisfactory professional conduct" as opposed to "serious
professional misconduct." Schneyer, Thoughts on Compatibility, supra note 9, at 28. UPC is
conduct that "falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is
entitled to expect." See LegalProfessionNational Law 2011 (Cth) s 5.4.2 (Austl.).
Examples of UPC include delay in handling client matters, shoddy service, failure to
clarify fee terms, and careless errors. Schneyer, Thoughts on Compatibility, supra note 9, at 28.
Australian regulators take UPC complaints quite seriously. See id at 28-29. Some UPC may
technically violate the rules of professional conduct but is nonetheless investigated and resolved by
the OLSC. Id. at 29. UPC complaints are not referred to the Bar or NSW Law Society for
disciplinary proceedings, because the complaints are thought to be too minor to warrant formal
disciplinary proceedings and because the Bar and NSW Law Society were criticized in the past for
being unresponsive to them. Id. In many other cases, complaints allege UPC that does not violate
ethics rules, but is thought nonetheless to justify regulatory attention as a "consumer complaint." Id.
at 28 n.55. Such complaints are often filed by unsophisticated clients who have no other recourse.
See Steve Mark, The Office of the Legal Services Commissioner-Consumer Protection,
PRECEDENT, Jan.-Feb. 2009, at 12, 14 (noting that over fifty percent of the complaints filed with the
OLSC are consumer complaints). The considerable administrative expense that Australian
regulators incur in giving such serious attention to UPC complaints may have encouraged them to
adopt PMBR programs in hopes of reducing complaint rates. See id Disciplinary systems in the
United States have traditionally responded weakly or not at all to such complaints, and whether PSR
should do more has been a topic of considerable debate. See infra Part III.B.
In England and Wales, consumer complaints now appear to be dealt with even more
forcefully than in Australia. Legal service providers must maintain an in-house process for
responding to such complaints. Legal Services Act of 2007, ch 29, pt 6 (Austl.). Complaints that
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wanted ILPs to develop and maintain an "ethical infrastructure," which
he defined as "formal and informal management policies, procedures
and controls, ... and habits of interaction... that supports and
encourages ethical behavior. '41 His aim was to reduce the risk of errors
and misconduct in law practices by motivating and helping firms to
detect institutional weaknesses and thereby avoid problems.4 2
Legislation in 2004 provided a mechanism for enforcing an ILP's
duty to maintain a satisfactory ethical infrastructure.43 To ensure that one
or more principals in an ILP have focused responsibility for discharging
this duty, the statute required every ILP to designate at least one licensed
NSW solicitor as its legal practitioner director ("LPD") 44 and to have
"appropriate management systems" in place to ensure that services are
provided in accordance with professional obligations. 45 LPDs are not
only generally responsible, like all lawyer principals in an ILP, for
overseeing the firm's delivery of legal services, but also specifically
responsible for implementing and maintaining the appropriate systems.46
Failure to meet that specific duty is professional misconduct for
which LPDs can in principle be sanctioned, and, in a serious case,
disqualified from further service as an LPD.47 LPDs also have duties to
prevent, report, and remedy serious professional misconduct by lawyers
in their firms.48
The 2004 legislation did not define "appropriate management
systems.,,49 But the Office of the Legal Services Commissioner
cannot be resolved in-house go to the new Office for Legal Complaints, whose board is controlled
by nonlawyers. Id. That office operates through ombudsmen with considerable power. Id. s 115. Ifa
complaint is found to have merit, the respondent may be directed to apologize, disgorge a fee,
rectify an error at her expense, or compensate the complainant in an amount up to £30,000. Id. ss
112-13, 126, 138(1).
41. Mark, AustralianRegulator, supra note 37, at 46.
42. Id. (calling the program a "quasi-educative mechanism" that moves away from "sole
reliance on complaints-based regulation" to include compliance-based regulation, in hopes of
providing greater consumer protection).
43. Legal ProfessionAct 2004 (NSW) (Austl.).
44. Id.s 140(1).
45. Id. s 140(3).
46. Id. A new regulatory program in England and Wales is similar but more intrusive and
more demanding of the designated compliance officers in firms. For a useful description, see Jane
Hunter, Outcomes-Focused Regulation in England & Wales: The Compliance Officer Roles,
QUALITY ASSURANCE REV., Winter 2012, at 1, 1-6.
47. Legal ProfessionAct 2004 (NSW) ss 140(5), 141 (1A) (Austl.). Moreover, an ILP with no
authorized LPD may be forced into receivership and shut down. Schneyer, Thoughts on
Comparability, supra note 9, at 31. In this sense, the PMBR program is firm-based as well as
management-based. Id. at 30-31. But the OLSC regards these powers as a last resort, not a central
feature of the program. Id. at 27.
48. Legal ProfessionAct 2004 (NSW) ss 141, 143 (Austl.); see also Parker, Gordon & Mark,
An EmpiricalAssessment, supranote 26, at 471 (discussing a LPD's duties).
49. The term "appropriate" has the advantage of flexibility, which is necessary in light of
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("OLSC"), in collaboration with the Law Society of NSW, the
malpractice insurer in the state, and knowledgeable academics and
practitioners, developed a test for determining whether an ILP has
appropriate systems in place.50 The test is whether the firm has and
utilizes appropriate systems for managing ten areas in which problems
commonly arise, as reflected in client complaints over time.51 By
identifying these problem areas and putting ILPs on notice of the areas
for which management systems are needed, the OLSC and its
52
collaborators gave the term "ethical infrastructure" a concrete meaning.
The OLSC issued a list of the ten problem areas to be addressed
and the objectives that management systems should be designed to meet
in each area. 3 In the area of records management, for example, the
objective is "minimizing the likelihood of loss or destruction of
correspondence and documents through appropriate ...retention, filing,
archiving etc., and providing for compliance with requirements
regarding registers of files, safe custody, [and] financial interests. 54 In
the area of undertakings the objective is appropriate "monitoring
of... timely compliance with notices, orders, rulings, directions or other
requirements of regulatory authorities such as the OLSC, [and] courts."5 5
Far from requiring all ILPs to implement the same procedures and
wide variations in the size, clientele, personnel, and practice fields of firms providing legal services.
For a U.S. analogy, see MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2012) (requiring law firm
partners and lawyers with comparable management authority to make "reasonable efforts to ensure
that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonableassurance that all lawyers in the firm conform
R. 5.1 cmt. 3 (noting that the measures
to the Rules of Professional Conduct" (emphasis added)); id.
to be taken can depend on a firm's "structure and the nature of its practice").
50. See Parker, Gordon & Mark, An EmpiricalAssessment, supranote 26, at 471.
51. Id.at 471-72. In choosing the areas to stress, the OLSC and its collaborators sought an
approach that lawyers would regard as practical and useful. See Fortney & Gordon, Australian
Approach,supra note 36, at 161.
52. When I introduced the term "ethical infrastructure" in 1991, I chiefly had in mind
procedures for detecting and resolving conflicts of interest, tracking deadlines, accounting for client
funds, and ensuring that inexperienced lawyers and other firm personnel are properly trained and
supervised-examples identified in the Model Rules. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1

cmts. 2-5 (2012). In my opinion, the NSW PMBR program represents a major advance in
"operationalizing" the term.
53.

OFFICE OF LEGAL SERVS. COMM'R, ANNUAL REPORT 2003-2004, at 7 (2004), availableat

The
http://www.olsc.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/olsc/documents/pdf/2003-2004-annualreport.pdf.
ten areas are: negligence; communication; delay; liens/file transfers; cost disclosure/billing
practices/termination of retainer; conflicts of interest; records management; undertakings (i.e.,
timely compliance with notices, orders, rulings, directions, and other requirements of regulatory
authorities); supervision of practice and staff; and trust account regulations. Id. Most of these areas
chiefly implicate duties to clients, violations of which can often be reduced by appropriate policies,
procedures, and systems. Id.Perhaps the fulfillment of some duties to third parties, the courts, or the
public cannot be ensured as readily through systematization. Id.In any event, the ten areas do not,
and are presumably not intended to, cover the entire ethical waterfront.
54. Id.
55. Id
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systems, the OLSC's aim is to encourage ILPs to adopt procedures and
build systems that suit their own practices.5 6 In that respect, each ILP has
considerable autonomy.
All this is what makes the NSW program "management-based
regulation," a regulatory model formulated by theorists Cary Coglianese
and David Lazer that requires firms to engage in their own planning
and develop their own management processes in order to achieve
externally defined but broadly stated public goals.57 Compliance with
professional duties is, of course, an example. But what exactly makes the
PMBR program proactive? And to what degree is the program
compliance- rather than complaints-based?
The proactivity element turns on a self-assessment process
developed by the OLSC and its expert collaborators. The process
requires the LPDs in every new ILP to report on the firm's management
systems 5 8 by completing the OLSC's self-assessment form, which is
built on the ten problem areas and the objectives ILPs should strive to
meet in each area.59 The self-assessment form also suggests criteria for
LPDs to use to determine whether their ILP is in compliance with each
objective, and offers in each case examples of what would count as
evidence of compliance.6 ° With respect to the objective of maintaining
56. See Parker, Gordon & Mark, An EmpiricalAssessment, supra note 26, at 473.
57. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 691, 693-96 (2003) [hereinafter
Coglianese & Lazer, Management-Based Regulation]; see also Parker, Gordon & Mark, An
Empirical Assessment, supra note 26, at 470 (contrasting management-based regulation with two
more directive regulatory models: (1) external regulation that sets out the management processes or
technologies that firms must use to counter specified risks and that sanctions violators ex post, and
(2) traditional regulation of business, which bans specific conduct and also sanctions violators ex
post). Coglianese and Lazer posit that management-based regulation is most appropriate where the
services being regulated are highly individualized and contextual and the outcomes being sought
cannot easily be measured by external regulators. Coglianese & Lazer, Management-Based
Regulation, supra, at 713-15. Australians who have studied the NSW PMBR program regard the
objective of promoting ethical compliance as consistent with Coglianese and Lazer's model. See
Parker, Gordon & Mark, An Empirical Assessment, supra note 26, at 473-74. And that model is
consistent with trends in regulatory theory. Id. at 470 (noting that legislators and regulators are
increasingly encouraging or forcing business organizations to adopt effective systems and
procedures to achieve compliance with legal and ethical duties); see generally Douglas C. Michael,
FederalAgency Use ofAudited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 171
(1995) (evaluating audited self-regulation programs throughout the federal government).
58. A number of ILPs were formed between 2001 and 2004, before the self-assessments
began. Parker, Gordon & Mark, An EmpiricalAssessment, supra note 26, at 473 n.25. Those ILPs
were asked to provide their initial self-assessments in 2004 or 2005. See id.
59. OFFICE OF LEGAL SERVS. COMM'R, SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING THE ELEMENTS OF
"APPROPRIATE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS" FOR INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICES IN NSW 1 (2013)
[hereinafter
SUGGESTIONS
FOR
INCORPORATED
LEGAL
PRACTICES],
available at

http://www.olsc.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/olsc/documents/pdf/ilp-self assessment-form august20l
3.pdf.
60. Id.
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"competent work practices" in order to avoid negligence, for example,
one compliance criterion is whether firm lawyers practice "only in areas
where they have appropriate competence and expertise. ' ' 61 And a
"written statement setting out the types of matters" in which the ILP will
accept engagements would count as evidence of compliance.62
In preparing the self-assessment form, an LPD must indicate the
extent to which her ILP has achieved each objective, using a five-point
scale ranging from "Non-Compliant" to "Fully Compliant Plus.

'63

After

the form is filed, a staff member in the OLSC's Incorporated Practice
Unit reviews the information provided and the LPD's compliance
ratings. 64 If the LPD rates the ILP compliant or better on all counts, the
OLSC ordinarily notifies the LPD that no further action is required. If
instead the self-assessment indicates that the ILP is less than compliant
with any objectives, the OLSC writes to the LPD, providing guidance
and offering to assist the ILP to become compliant.65 The LPD is
expected in due course either to confirm in writing that compliance has
been achieved or to provide an update on progress, in which case the
OLSC will expect further responses.66
It is not uncommon for initial self-assessments to rate an ILP only
partially compliant or (less often) noncompliant with one or more
objectives, 67 triggering a dialogue until an agreement is eventually

61. Id. at 3.
62. Id.; see also Mark, Australian Regulator, supra note 37, at 49 (analyzing the selfassessment form).
63. SUGGESTIONS FOR INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICES, supra note 59, at 2; see also
Parker, Gordon & Mark, An Empirical Assessment, supra note 26, at 473-74. The five points and
what they mean are as follows: Non-Compliant means "Not all Objectives have not been
addressed"; Partially Compliant means "All Objectives have been addressed but the management
systems ... are not fully functional"; Compliant means "Management systems for all Objectives
exist and are fully functional"; Fully Compliant means "Management systems exist for all
Objectives and all are fully functional and all are regularly assessed for effectiveness"; and Fully
Compliant Plus means "All Objectives have been addressed, all management systems are
documented and all are fully functional and. .. assessed regularly for effectiveness plus
improvements are made when needed." SUGGESTIONS FOR INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICES,
supra note 59, at 2; see also Parker, Gordon & Mark, An EmpiricalAssessment, supra note 26, at
474 tbl.2.
64. Fortney & Gordon, Australian Approach, supranote 36, at 165.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. A summary of the self-assessment ratings filed by the more than 600 NSW ILPs as of
June 2008 revealed that only sixty-two percent rated themselves compliant with all ten objectives.
Mark, Australian Regulator, supra note 37, at 52; Parker, Gordon & Mark, An Empirical
Assessment, supranote 26, at 483 tbl.3. Half the others became fully compliant within three months
of that assessment. Mark, AustralianRegulator, supra note 37, at 52. In the areas of supervision of
practice and communication, eighteen percent of the firms rated themselves partially compliant or
noncompliant, and no fewer than eight to nine percent gave themselves those ratings in every other
area except trust account regulations. Parker, Gordon & Mark, An EmpiricalAssessment, supranote
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reached. In the very rare cases where no self-assessment is filed, or the
response is incomplete or suggests serious shortcomings, or the OLSC
receives multiple complaints implicating an ILP's operations, the OLSC
may request follow-up assessments, conduct a practice review, or, very
occasionally, conduct a formal audit.6 8 But ILPs have no general duty to
file periodic self-assessments.
Two factors are likely to discourage overly rosy or perfunctory selfassessments. On one hand, the transmittal letter accompanying the selfassessment form that the OLSC sends to new ILPs reminds the LPD that
69
the OLSC (and the NSW Law Society) have authority to audit ILPs.

On the other hand, the letter encourages the LPD to use the selfassessment process to improve the firm's delivery of legal services and
to contact the OLSC for assistance or guidance. 70 The self-assessment
form itself seems designed to give ILPs "a number of 'face-saving'
options to admit less than full compliance., 71 The point is to educate
firms toward compliance, not to detect ethics violations and discipline
violators.72 In NSW, rule violations and management objectives as yet
unmet are two different things. This is the sense in which PMBR is
compliance- rather than complaints-based.
B. Positive Assessments of the Program'sImpact
I would not expect the ABA and the state supreme courts to jump
on the PMBR bandwagon without evidence that doing so could deliver
substantial benefits at reasonable cost. Fortunately, although the PMBR
program in NSW has only been fully operational since 2004, such
evidence already exists. Two well-conceived empirical studies have
examined its impact and drawn favorable conclusions.73 Part II.B. 1
26, at 483 tbl.3.
68. Parker, Gordon & Mark, An EmpiricalAssessment, supra note 26, at 473. In the first half
of 2008, the OLSC conducted four formal reviews; resource constraints generally limit it to seven or
eight audits a year. Schneyer, Thoughts on Compatibility, supra note 9, at 32 n.72; see also infra
note 122 and accompanying text. In one case, a practice review was conducted after the OLSC
received complaints about an LPD's lack of supervision. Schneyer, Thoughts on Compatibility,
supra note 9, at 32 n.72. The OLSC had the LPD reassess the firm's management systems. Id.
When the new self-assessment rated the ILP as only partially compliant on eight of the ten
objectives, the OLSC conducted a "compliance audit." Id.The audit report noted several areas for
improvement, prompting the LPD to implement new systems. Id Rather than sanctioning the LPD,
in other words, the OLSC worked together with the LPD to bring the ILP into compliance.
69. See Fortney & Gordon, supra note 36, at 168-70. The self-assessment form is to be
completed and returned to the OLSC within three months, leaving ample time for a considered
response. Id. at 169 n.99.
70. Id.at 168-70.
71. Parker, Gordon & Mark, An EmpiricalAssessment, supranote 26, at 482.
72. See Schneyer, Thoughts on Compatibility,supra note 9, at 32.
73. See generally Fortney & Gordon, Australian Approach, supra note 36 (finding that
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draws on a study finding that the program has greatly reduced the
volume of disciplinary complaints filed per practitioner per year against
lawyers in ILPs.74 This holds true both when comparing the complaint
rates for those lawyers before and after their ILP's self-assessment and
when comparing the ILPs' post-assessment complaint rates with the
rates for unincorporated law practices over the same period. Part II.B.2
draws on a recent study that evidences success of another sort, namely,
general (though not universal) acceptance of the program by ILPs,
including acknowledgements by LPDs that the program has improved
their firms' operations.75 Part II.C provides indirect evidence
that the
76
cost of the NSW PMBR program has so far been modest.

1. Reduction in Complaints
Proponents of regulating the management of ethical risks by law
firms have often assumed that doing so is especially important for large
firms, which need sound bureaucratic controls.77 Yet, the OLSC in
NSW, like most disciplinary agencies in the United States, have long
received a disproportionately high percentage of complaints against
lawyers who practice alone or in small firms.78 This suggests that it
might actually be solo and small firm practices that need stronger
management systems to promote lawyer compliance with certain ethical
duties, especially duties running to clients. The vast majority of IELPs in
NSW are quite small.79
The most extensive empirical study of the NSW PMBR program,
using OLSC complaints data, takes the reduction of complaint rates as
its measure of program success.80 The investigators acknowledge that
regulating ILPs has contributed to the revision of management systems in NSW); Parker, Gordon &
Mark, An EmpiricalAssessment, supra note 26 (finding that the NSW approach to regulating ILPs

has a positive impact on ethical management and behavior).
74. See infra Part II.B. 1.
75. See infra Part II.B.2.
76. See infra Part I.C.
77. This includes my own early arguments stressing the importance of promoting sound
ethical infrastructures in large law firms. Schneyer, Disciplinefor Law Firms, supra note 25, at 111,37-45.
78. See Parker, Gordon & Mark, An Empirical Assessment, supra note 26, at 481 & n.54
(citing Bruce L. Arnold & Fiona M. Kay, Social Capital, Violations of Trust and the Vulnerability
of Isolates: The Social Organizationof Law Practice and ProfessionalSelf-Regulation, 23 INT'L J.
Soc. L. 321, 333 (1995) (explaining the phenomenon)); see also RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN

LAWYERS 145 (1989) (reporting that in the early 1980s, more than eighty percent of the lawyers
disciplined in California, Illinois, and the District of Columbia were sole practitioners and none
practiced in a firm with more than seven lawyers, yet many lawyers worked in much larger firms in
those jurisdictions at the time).
79.

Schneyer, Thoughts on Compatibility, supra note 9,

at 31. The vast majority of

unincorporated law practices in NSW are also small. Id. at 33.
80. Parker, Gordon & Mark, An EmpiricalAssessment, supra note 26, at 478-94 (presenting
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complaint rates are neither a perfect nor the only conceivable measure of
the program's "ethical output," but argue convincingly that it was the
best available measure because complaints data existed for all NSW
practitioners in ILPs and unincorporated firms, because all complaints
are filed with the OLSC, and because the practice areas for which the
OLSC requires self-assessment and appropriate management systems
generate the most complaints. 8 '
The study measured complaint rates8 2 for lawyers in the
approximately 630 ILPs that were operating in NSW in 2008 and had
already gone through the initial self-assessment process, as well as
complaint rates for lawyers in 354 unincorporated practices.83 It tested
three hypotheses: (1) that after self-assessment, ILPs would have lower
complaint rates per practitioner per year than they had before selfassessment; (2) that ILPs, after self-assessment, would have fewer
complaints per lawyer per year than unincorporated law practices;
and (3) assuming that the LPDs' self-assessment ratings were
reliable, that ILPs that rated their management systems higher on the
compliance scale 84would have fewer complaints than those who rated
themselves lower.
The findings on the first hypothesis were startling. On average,
complaints dropped by two-thirds after ILPs completed their initial selfassessment. 85 To test the second hypothesis, the study calculated
the results of this study).
81. Id. at 478-79 (internal quotation marks omitted). The authors do note that complaints can
only be a rough measure of client dissatisfaction because some clients with legitimate complaints do
not complain and because only sixty percent of the complaints filed with the OLSC in the relevant
time period were filed by present or former clients of the lawyer(s) involved. Id. They also
acknowledge that using changes in complaint rates as a measure of improvement in a firm's ethical
compliance might be criticized for focusing too heavily on consumer service issues and too lightly
on matters in which lawyers breach duties to the courts or third parties, often in order to benefit
clients. Id. at 498-99.
82. For an explanation and justification of the methods by which the investigators calculated
complaint rates, see id. at 484-93.
83. Id. at 481. Complaints filed during the same three months in which an ILP was selfassessed were not counted because it was unclear whether they concerned events before or after
assessment. Id. at 485 n.58. Measuring changes in complaint rates before and after the initial selfassessment, rather than before and after the date of incorporation, was vital because some ILPs were
first established as firms when they incorporated and because it was the self-assessments that were
hypothesized to prompt changes in practice management, not incorporation itself. Id. at 485.
Because many of the ILPs that were studied had incorporated between 2001 and 2004, before selfassessments began, there was often a substantial time lag between incorporation and assessment. Id.
at 485 n.59. This was helpful in comparing the complaint rates of self-assessed ILPs with those of
unincorporated law practices. It strengthened the investigators' confidence that the self-assessed
ILPs' lower complaint rates were attributable to the PMBR program rather than to differences
between clientele, firm structure, or practice fields of incorporated and unincorporated firms.
84. Id. at 485-92.
85. Id. at 485. This drop in complaints was statistically significant at the highest confidence
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complaint rates for every year from 2001 (when incorporation was first
permitted) to 2008 for 354 unincorporated firms in NSW that had two or
more principals in 2008, and then compared their complaint rates per
practitioner per year with those of the 143 ILPs that had two or more
principals at the time.8 6 Before self-assessment, the ILPs had a slightly
lower average complaint rate than the unincorporated firms.87 But after
self-assessment, the ILP complaint rate was only about one-thirdthe rate
for unincorporated firms, which was statistically significant at the
highest confidence level and supported the conclusion that the "selfassessment process makes a big difference to complaint rates. 8 8 As for
the third hypothesis, the study found little evidence of a relationship
between an ILP's self-assessed compliance ratings and its subsequent
complaint rates, 89 which suggests that it was the learning and
infrastructural adaptations resulting from the self-assessment process
that reduced ILP complaint rates.
In sum, this extensive and sophisticated study found considerable
reason to believe that NSW-style proactive management-based
regulation can enhance the quality and probity of a law firm's services. 90
2. The ILPs' Generally Positive Reception of PMBR
An American lawyer might suppose that Australian lawyers and
law firms would initially have been hostile to having a new layer of
regulation imposed on them, especially a layer introduced by an
executive branch agency like the OLSC rather than the organized bar or

level. Id.at 486 & n.60. Moreover, the drop was not an artifact of any overall drop in complaints
against NSW practitioners over the relevant time period; nor could it be attributed to some external
event such as a publicity campaign by the OLSC or the malpractice insurer in the state. Id.
at 486,
86. Id. at 486-87.
87. Id. at 487-88.
88. Id.at 488. While there was some evidence that ILPs as a group might have been slightly
better managed at the outset and thus had slightly lower rates than unincorporated firms-even
without self-assessment-the point is that after self-assessment there was "an additional huge
difference" in favor of the ILPs. Id.
89. Id. at 491. Although the insignificance of the ILPs' initial compliance ratings might
suggest that LPDs did not take the assessment process seriously, the fact that quite a few LPDs were
willing to assess themselves as less than compliant with some management-system objectives
suggests the opposite, as do findings in an earlier study that sixty-three percent of the selfassessment forms were returned to the OLSC with substantial comments regarding the ILPs'
management systems (though comments were not required) and that fifty-six percent of the ILPs in
the study engaged in substantial dialogue with the OLSC and reported making substantial changes
in their management systems as a result of the process. Id at 493 (citing SEUMAS MILLER &
MATHEW WARD, OFFICE OF LEGAL SERVS. COMM'R, COMPLAINTS AND SELF-ASSESSMENT DATA
ANALYSIS IN RELATION TO INCORPORATED LEGAL PRACTICES 3 (2006), available at

http://www.cappe.edu.au/docs/reports/consultancy/OLSC.pdf).
90. Id. at 500 (stating that optimism about the potential benefits of PMBR "might have some
real-life traction").
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the courts. 9' On that assumption, however, the generally favorable

reaction of ILPs in NSW to the OLSC's PMBR program, as reflected
in survey data collected in Professor Susan Fortney's recent impact
study in cooperation with the OLSC, should also count as a
programmatic success. 92
The study looked at the impact of the program on ILPs from the
point of view of solicitors, virtually all of whom were LPDs, at the 143
ILPs that responded to the survey. 93 The results indicate that the LPDs

generally understood the duties that they were assuming when
designated by their firms. 94 Seventy-five percent of the respondents had
worked with their ILP (or a predecessor firm) for over five years, and
had institutional knowledge to draw on in managing the firm. 95 The
survey chiefly concerns how respondents viewed the relationship
between the self-assessment process and the "ethical norms, systems,
conduct, and culture in [their] firms.

96

Here are some representative

survey results.
Eighty-four percent of the respondents reported that they had
"revised firm policies or procedures relating to the delivery of legal
services," and seventy-one percent stated explicitly that they had done so
in connection with the completion of the self-assessment process.97

Moreover, forty-seven percent reported that their ILPs had adopted
entirely new systems, policies, or procedures," and twenty-nine percent
said their firm was devoting more time to "ethics initiatives. 9 9
Some survey questions asked whether the respondents' firms had
policies and procedures related to communication with clients and
supervision of personnel, two areas explicitly covered in the self91. In 2009, Commissioner Mark stated that a number of ILPs were initially "nervous about
the process" of self-assessment or practice review. Mark, Australian Regulator, supra note 37, at
52. He hastened to add, however, that a number of ILPs thanked the OLSC after the self-assessment
and review process was over, and said they had improved themselves as a result. Id.
92. Fortney & Gordon, AustralianApproach, supranote 36, at 172-81.
93. See id. at 170 & n.103. The Fortney study used an online survey of LPDs at ILPs
incorporated between January 1, 2007 and January 1, 2011. Those ILPs had all gone through the
self-assessment process, and varied widely in size. Id. at 170. Ten percent of them had fewer than
three solicitors, seventy-eight percent had three to nine, seven percent had ten to nineteen, and five
percent had twenty or more. Id. The survey questionnaire was sent to 356 potential respondents, 141
of whom completed the questionnaire, a response rate of 39.6%. Id. at 169. A second article will
discuss data obtained in follow-up interviews with fewer LPDs.
94. Id. at 171.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 172 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Id.
99. Id. Ninety-seven percent of the respondents reported that they spent no more than thirtyfour percent of their work time on LPD duties and sixty-seven percent spent no more than ten
percent of their time carrying out those duties. Id. at 171.
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assessment form. 100 The form itself cited a number of policies and
procedures as examples of appropriate systems for meeting the
objectives in those areas.' 01 On client communication, close to one
hundred percent of the respondents said their firms had the very policies
and procedures mentioned in the form, but fewer said they had systems
not mentioned in the form.'0 2 Results were similar with respect to
supervision. 0 3 This suggests that the assessment form itself may have
had educational value.
As for the impact of the assessment process on attitudes, ethical
norms, conduct, and culture in the ILPs, slightly more than half the
respondents who could remember what their attitudes toward the selfassessment
process
and
the
appropriate-management-system
requirement had been before they completed the self-assessment form
said their impressions at the time were negative. 104 But post-assessment
attitudes were considerably more favorable. Some respondents called the
process "transformative" in shaping their views of the program, 10 5 and
06
twenty-five respondents described positive changes in their attitudes.1
While the post-assessment attitudes of some remained negative,
07
respondents generally recognized the educational value of the process. 1
In fact, sixty-two percent agreed that it was "a learning exercise that
enabled [their] firm to improve client service," and only fifteen percent
disagreed with that statement. 10 8 Asked which aspects of firm practice
the process had affected, the respondents in the aggregate replied that
the impact on firm management, risk management, and supervision was
high, while the impact on client satisfaction, workplace satisfaction, and
firm morale was marginal.'0 9 Fortney and co-author Tahlia Gordon find
those responses understandable because management and supervision
were so clearly related to the objectives that appropriate management
systems are meant to achieve. 110 Finally, sixty-eight percent of the
respondents disagreed with the statement that the self-assessment
process was "a waste of time." 1"

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 173.
Id.
Id.at 174.
Id. at 175.
Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.at 176.
Id. at 176-77.
Id.at 180.
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C. Evidence that ProgrammaticCosts Are Modest
The cost of the NSW PMBR program consists of the OLSC's
expenditures to administer the program and the time and expense the
ILPs incur in completing the self-assessment form and in any follow-up
practice review or audit1 12 Against those costs, a full accounting would
factor in the savings that the OLSC and the NSW Law Society
experience as a result of the sizable reduction in complaint rates
attributable to the program. 113 While these costs are difficult to estimate,
there is indirect evidence that they have been modest.14
Several facts suggest that the OLSC's PMBR costs are also modest.
First, the program is funded entirely by interest on lawyers' trust
accounts and staff requirements have been minimal; the Incorporated
Legal Practice Unit, which examines the self-assessment forms, consists
of two people. 15 The OLSC has taken additional steps to economize
without unduly constraining the program. It recently launched the OLSC
Portal, a secure web-based application that, among other things,
automates self-assessment reporting, simplifies practice reviews, permits
electronic tracking of OLSC audits, and allows all available complaints
data to be accessed through a single gateway. 16 The portal also
facilitates "risk profiling" by the OLSC, 117 a cost-saving strategy that
calls for some discussion.
Risk profiling assumes that certain factors create or heighten the
risk that serious professional misconduct or UPC will occur at a firm." 8
These factors can sometimes be identified, and, if so, worthwhile steps
can be taken in advance to reduce the chance that a risk will materialize.
Insofar as the OLSC, in consultation with others, can discern "lead
indicators" of potential misconduct in particular firms, it can monitor
and advise those firms more extensively than others, conserving
112. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
114. One indication that the ILPs' costs are modest is the fact that the respondents spend
relatively little time working on LPD duties. See supra note 99. Of course, if the PMBR program is
extended to apply to the much more numerous unincorporated law practices in NSW, the aggregate
administrative cost to law practices would be considerably higher. But so, presumably, would be the
benefits. In 2008, eighty percent of the private practices in NSW were unincorporated, but the ratio
of ILPs to unincorporated practices has probably risen since then. See Briton & McLean, supra note
36, at 249 & n.17.
115. Email from Tahlia Gordon to author, supra note 37.
116. Office of the Legal Services Commissioner, OLSC Portal, available at
http://www.olsc.nsw.gov.au/olsc/lscportal.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2013); see also Steve Mark,
The Legal Practice Management andAudit System (LPMAS), WIrHOUT PREJUDICE, Oct. 2010, at 2,
2 [hereinafter Mark, LPMAS], available at http://www.olsc.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/
olsc/documents/pdf/wp_issue52_oct2010.pdf.
117. Mark, LPMAS, supra note 116.
118. See supra note 40 (defining UPC).
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resources.' 19 The OLSC's experience is that misconduct and errors are
not randomly distributed across firms and that a minority of firms are
120
responsible for the "lion's share" of complaints and misconduct.
Resource limitations constrain the OLSC from auditing more than a
handful of firms per year, and, so far, it has identified audit targets
reactively--on the basis of triggering events such as a disproportionate
number of complaints or a referral from the NSW trust account
inspector.12 1 But the OLSC hopes that by using data collected through its
automated portal, it can identify audit targets using profiles based on
other variables as well, such as a firm's practice field(s), clientele, and
number of lawyers. 122 The aim is to economize by using more finely
to determine which firms are most at risk and in need
grained profiles
23
of assistance. 1

III. THE EVOLUTION OF PSR IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SYSTEMIC
WEAKNESSES THAT PMBR PROGRAMS COULD AMELIORATE
12 4
Part II described the key features of the PMBR program in NSW,
and presented empirical evidence that the NSW program is working
well. 25 Drawing on Part II, Part III tries to make the case for bringing
PMBR to the United States, at least as an experiment 26to determine
whether it can strengthen PSR as it is currently structured.

119. Mark, LPMAS, supranote 116 (explaining risk profiling).
120. Id.
121. Email from Tahlia Gordon to author, supra note 37.
122. Mark, LPMAS, supra note 116. Evidence bears out the common belief that sole
practitioners and small-firm lawyers tend to be at greater risk for ethics violations than lawyers in
larger firms. See Parker, Gordon & Mark, An EmpiricalAssessment, supra note 26, at 481. That is
the case in NSW, where a disproportionately high percentage of complaints are filed against those
lawyers. Id. It has also been the case in the United States. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID
LuBAN, LEGAL ETHIcs 997 & n.54 (5th ed. 2009) (noting that in 2001, approximately fifty-six
percent of the lawyers in California practiced alone or in firms with fewer than ten lawyers, yet
those lawyers accounted for ninety-five percent of disciplinary investigations and ninety-eight
percent of sanctions). Solo and small firm lawyers tend to practice in fields such as family law,
criminal defense, immigration, personal injury, and consumer bankruptcy-fields in which clients
tend to be unsophisticated. Id. at 997-98. Among the most common grounds for sanctioning such
lawyers in California at the time were misappropriation of client funds, neglect of files, and failure
to communicate with clients. Id. These problems that call for consumer protection and that
appropriate law office management systems can help to prevent them. Moreover, the necessity of
mastering new technologies in order to practice law today may put solo and small firm lawyers at
still greater risk than lawyers in larger firms, which have substantial in-house technical assistance.
See Schneyer, On FurtherReflection, supranote 6, at 626 n.265.
123. Mark, LPMAS, supranote 116.
124. See supra Part H.
125. See supra Part 1I.
126. See infra Part lI.A-D.
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As part of its review of the disciplinary process, the Standing
Committee could encourage state supreme courts to test some limited
PMBR programs in which a sampling of law firms would be asked to
provide a NSW-style self-assessment of their ethics-related management
systems. At a minimum, this should get more law firms thinking about
the matter. 127 I anticipate, however, that more than a few lawyers and
judges in the United States would dismiss PMBR out of hand as entirely
alien to our regulatory traditions. Part III tries to dispel this attitude. 28 It
argues that PSR has evolved in recent decades in ways that lay a
foundation for adding PMBR programs to the regulatory mix. 129 These
developments include a greater awareness of the importance of law firm
management in promoting ethical compliance and the adoption of some
forms of proactive regulation. Part III also argues that PSR, as currently
constituted, has some 1regulatory
weaknesses that NSW-style PMBR
30
programs could correct.

A.

The ABA Has Acknowledged the Importance of Law Firm
Management in PromotingEthical Compliance

The ABA's 1908 Canons of Ethics 13 1 did not even refer to law
firms. 13 2 By the 1980s, however, two-thirds of American lawyers
practiced in multi-lawyer settings, and well over half the lawyers in
private practice worked in multi-lawyer firms. 133 Many law firms had
branch offices, making intra-firm coordination more complicated.
Associate-to-partner ratios were often three-to-one or more,
127.

See Parker, Gordon & Mark, An EmpiricalAssessment, supra note 26, at 495 (inferring

from study data that the self-assessment process in NSW is encouraging many practitioners
"systematically to think through practice management issues, including ethics management, for the
very first time"). The basic idea of self-assessment requirements is not novel in the United States.
See, e.g., Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., To What Extent Can a Disciplinary Code Assure the Competence
of Lawyers?, 61 TEMP. L. REv. 1211, 1234 (1988) (suggesting that bar counsel could effectively
enforce broad ethical duties of law firm management by requiring firms to report periodically on the

measures they take to provide reasonable supervision). Cf Laurel S. Terry, Professor of Law, Pa.
State Univ., Presentation at a Meeting of the Nat'l Org. of Bar Counsel, A Modest Proposal?:
Should NOBC Members Use Rule 5.1 More Proactively? (Aug. 9, 2008) (asking an audience of
disciplinary counsel whether their state supreme court could implement a PMBR program by simply

adding the following two questions to each lawyer's bar dues statement: "Are you subject to Rule
5.1 ? If so, have you considered whether you are in compliance with Rule 5.1 this year?").
128. See infra Part HII.A-D.
129. See infra Part ILI.A-D.
130. See infra Part HLI.A-D.

131. CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS (1908).
132. See id. This is not surprising, since the vast majority of lawyers in private practice at the
time were sole practitioners. Law firms were not mentioned in the Canons until 1928, when a new
Canon was added stating, quaintly, that "[p]artnerships among lawyers ... are very common and are

not to be condemned." CANONS OF PROF'L ETHics Canon 33 (1937).
133.

ABEL, supra note 78, at 179, 300 tbl.37c.
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underscoring the need for supervision. And, firms
134 were hiring many
nonlawyers, who required training and monitoring.
In this environment, the ABA recognized how important law firm
management had become in promoting ethical compliance. As adopted
in 1983, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct imposed
unprecedentedly broad ethical duties on management.'3 5 Model Rule
5.1 (a) required "a partner in a law firm [to] "make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance
that all [of its] lawyers ... conform to the Rules of Professional
Conduct.' ' 136 Likewise, Rule 5.3(a) required partners to make
"reasonable efforts to ensure that the[ir] firm has in effect measures
giving reasonable assurance that the... conduct of [nonlawyers
associated with the firm] is compatible with the [lawyers'] professional
obligations. 137 Taking "measures" is presumably the functional
equivalent of establishing appropriate policies, procedures, and
management systems.
These two Rules differ markedly from most provisions in the
Model Rules, which concern what I will call lawyers' "first-order
duties"--duties running directly to clients, tribunals, the profession,
certain third parties, or the public. Rules 5.1(a) and 5.3(a), by contrast,
posit "second-order duties"; they currently require partners and lawyers
with "comparable managerial authority" to take "measures" to ensure
that all lawyers in a firm comply with their first-order duties

134. See id. at 315 tbl.49; ERWIN 0. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER: PROFESSIONAL
ORGANIZATION MAN? 244-45 (1969). In addition, consultants were advising some law firms on risk
management, and some malpractice carriers were offering their insureds loss-prevention advice. See
Schneyer, On Further Reflection, supra note 6, at 589-90 & nn.56-59. To this day, however, those
sources of advice have probably had a much greater impact on large firms than on small ones. Id.
135. I call these duties unprecedented because they go well beyond the more familiar idea that
a lawyer with "direct supervisory authority" over another lawyer must make reasonable efforts to
ensure that that lawyer conforms to ethics rules. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(c)(2)
(1983); see also id. R. 5.3(b) (obligating a lawyer who directly supervises a lay employee at a firm
to ensure that the employee's conduct is consistent with lawyers' professional obligations).
136. Id. R. 5.1(a) (1983). Nearly all states have adopted this Rule, though sometimes with
slightly different wording. See GILLERS ET AL., supra note 6, at 334-35. Most states that did so
followed suit after the ABA amended the Rule in 2002 to address not only law firm partners but
also other lawyers who "individually or together with other lawyers possess[] comparable
managerial authority in a law firm." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2002); see
Lucian T. Pera, Grading ABA Leadership on Legal Ethics Leadership: State Adoption of the
Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 637, 778 & n.211
(2005). Comment 3 to Rule 5.1 adds that "the ethical atmosphere ofafirm can influence the conduct
of all its members, and the partners may not assume that all lawyers associated with the firm will
inevitably conform to the Rules." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 cmt. 3 (emphasis
added).
137. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3(a) (1983). Rule 5.3(a), like Rule 5.1(a), was
amended in 2002. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3(a) (2002).
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and nonlawyers1 38at the firm act in a manner that is consistent with
lawyers' duties.
While imposing these broad second-order duties on law firm
managers, however, the ABA seems to have taken it for granted that the
duties could and would be enforced just like first-order duties. The
Model Rules provide that Rules stated as "imperatives .... define
proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline,"'139 and 5.1(a)
and 5.3(a) are of that sort. To this day, however, we know very little
about what counts as compliance with those Rules, about compliance
rates, about whether the Rules induce management to take "measures,"
or about their impact on the nature and frequency of first-order
complaints against lawyers in firms. But four things are clear.
First, we continue to see many disciplinary complaints involving
forms of misconduct40 that seem avoidable if appropriate management
systems are in place.
Second, without enforcement of some sort, we cannot assume that
lawyer-managers will be sufficiently motivated (and knowledgeable) to
discharge their duties under Rules 5.1(a) and 5.3(a). 141 For if that
assumption were true, we would be hard pressed to explain such wellestablished facts as the following: many law firms have no procedures
governing their lawyers' investments in client businesses; many lack
billing guidelines other than those imposed by clients, many do "little or
nothing" to train new associates about proper billing procedures; 142 and
many law firm
partners regard being monitored by their partners as
143
an "affront."'

Third, cases disciplining law firm managers for violating state
equivalents of Model Rules 5.1(a) and 5.3(a) have
been very rare over
144
introduced.
were
Rules
the
since
decades
three
the
138. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a), 5.3(a) (2012).
139. Id. scope, cmt. 14 (emphasis added).
140. A large percentage of meritorious disciplinary complaints reportedly stem from
misconduct involving "low-level" agency problems, such as failing to communicate with clients,
neglecting clients' matters, missing deadlines, or stumbling into conflicts of interest. David B.
Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARv. L. REV. 799, 874 (1992).
141. Elizabeth Chambliss, The Nirvana Fallacy in Law Firm Regulation Debates, 33
FORDHAM UR. L.J. 119, 127 (2005) (citing reasons).
142. Id. at 127-28 & nn.45-50 (citing evidence); see also Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale:
An EmpiricalStudy of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour
Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REV. 239, 252-58 (2000) (citing evidence).
143. See Susan Saab Fortney, Are Law Firm PartnersIslands unto Themselves? An Empirical
Study of Law Firm Peer Review and Culture, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 271, 285, 293 (1996)

(finding, in a peer review study of 191 Texas law firms, that this attitude was common).
144.

See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 426 (6th ed. 2007) (citing only a

handful of such cases as of 2007). From 1992 to 2006, there were only thirteen recorded violations
of Rule 5.1 in Alabama, many of which probably implicated the direct supervisory duty of Rule
5.1 (b) rather than the broader duty of 5.1 (a). Long, supranote 25, at 807 n. 106 (citing data provided
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And fourth, it is a mistake to suppose that the non-enforcement of
these disciplinary Rules is a non-problem because the prospect of
malpractice liability resulting from a lack of appropriate management
systems is motivation enough. As noted earlier, a large share of
meritorious disciplinary complaints stem from misconduct that amounts
to low-level "agency problems," which usually cause little or no
compensable harm, such as failures to communicate with clients and
delays in attending to client matters. 145 By one count, seventy percent of
the clients who were harmed by malpractice in the 1980s sustained
losses too modest to interest a lawyer in taking their case or to make
suing worthwhile, even if a lawyer was found. 146 Moreover, although the
by the General Counsel of the Alabama State Bar). Over the same period, by contrast, there were
636 violations of the Alabama rule prohibiting neglect of client matters, violations that might often
reflect a lack of appropriate controls. Id.; see also Jonathan M. Epstein, Note, The In-House Ethics
Advisor: PracticalBenefits for the Modern Law Firm, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1011, 1015 (1994)
(noting "a dearth of bar opinions or cases describing what constitutes 'reasonable efforts' by
partners to ensure that subordinate lawyers within a firm comply with the Model Rules"). For
Epstein, that "dearth" suggests that the "reasonable efforts" standard is "under-enforced or
unenforceable," contrary to "the intent of the drafters." Epstein, supra, at 1015.
There does appear to be a slight uptick recently in the imposition of discipline for
violations of Rules 5.1(a) and 5.3(a), but certainly no trend. See, e.g., Bd. of Overseers of the Bar v.
Warren, 34 A.3d 1103, 1113 (Me. 2011) (holding that all the members of a firm's executive
committee were subject to discipline under Maine's equivalent of Model Rule 5.1 (a) because none
of them, when faced with the "significant malfeasance of a self-destructing partner," even
recognized their responsibility "to contemplate reporting the partner's conduct" to disciplinary
authorities, and stating that "when a firm's practices and policies do not require the firm's
leadership to at least consider whether it has an ethical obligation to report" the partner to
disciplinary authorities, the firm has failed as a matter of law to have in effect "measures giving
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm" conform to the rules of ethics (internal quotation
marks omitted)). One wonders how the court would have ruled if the committee members had
contemplated reporting the partner but decided against it. See In re Phillips, 244 P.3d 549, 550, 557
(Ariz. 2010) (en bane) (holding that respondent-the sole owner and general manager of a
"consumer law firm" with 250 employees, including thirty-eight lawyers--committed multiple
violations of Arizona's Rules 5.1(a) and 5.3(a), as evidenced by the numerous first-order complaints
that had been filed alleging misconduct by firm personnel). Cf In re Bailey, 821 A.2d 851, 853
(Del. 2003) (holding that "the managing partner of a law firm has enhanced duties, vis-A-vis other
lawyers and employees of the firm, to ensure the firm's compliance with its recordkeeping and tax
obligations under the ... Rules of Professional Conduct" (emphasis added)). Bailey, however, did
not cite Delaware's Rule 5.1(a) as the basis for the decision and suggested that disciplinary
proceedings under Delaware's Rules 5.1(a) or 5.3(a) could only be instituted against lawyermanagers who refuse to cooperate with disciplinary authorities or "knowingly fail[] to exercise even
a modicum of diligence" with respect to the creation, implementation, and ongoing assessment of
controls. Id. at 865.
145. See supra note 140; see also Wilkins, supra note 140, at 874. For the generally
unsophisticated clients who file such complaints, the disciplinary process is likely to be the "only
game in town," and therefore, the only legal process that might motivate lawyers to improve firm or
office infrastructure in order to avoid further problems.
146.

GEOFFREY C.

HAZARD,

JR. & DEBORAH

L. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION:

RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 583 (3d ed. 1994) (reporting that in the mid-1980s over seventy
percent of the individuals eligible to recover damages for legal malpractice would have been
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prospect of vicarious firm liability for harm caused by the negligence of
firm personnel gives management some incentive to adopt controls, it
may provide no insight into the controls to adopt. Malpractice suits
normally allege "first-order" negligence, such as a lawyer's failure to
file a claim before it became time-barred, not a lack of appropriate
management systems. 147 And although insured lawyers can sometimes
get loss-prevention advice from their carrier, other
148 lawyers have no
insurance, or have insurers that give no such advice.
All that aside, it is unseemly that a profession that prides itself on
its self-regulatory institutions would not try to structure them in the
manner that best encourages firms to have appropriate management
systems. Professors Elizabeth Chambliss and David Wilkins "subscribe
to a... vision of professional self-regulation... that demands that the
profession offer its own regulatory strategy" for promoting sound ethical
infrastructures in all law firms and law offices. 149 I agree. The question
becomes whether the disciplinary process can effectively promote
compliance with the broad ethical duties of law firm management. For
several reasons, I have concluded that it cannot. If this is correct, we can
either concede that Rules 5.1(a) and 5.3(a) are essentially hortatory, or
find another way to encourage compliance.
B. The Mismatch Between Broad EthicalDuties of Firm Management
and DisciplinaryEnforcement
This Subpart recounts the odyssey that led me to think that the
disciplinary process is structurally incapable of spurring law firm
managers to fulfill their 5.1(a) and 5.3(a) duties. At the outset, In re
Yacavino 150 piqued my interest. There, an inexperienced law firm
associate was suspended from practice for three years.1 51 He had
neglected his cases, made false status reports to clients, and prepared a
fake court order to further his deception.1 But he had also been
working alone and unsupervised in his firm's satellite office and the

entitled to less than one thousand dollars in damages).
147. Id.
148. See Schneyer, On FurtherReflection, supra note 6, at 627 & n.273 (reporting on a study

of a large sample of Wisconsin lawyers, which found that a considerable number were uninsured
and that eighty percent of the uninsured practiced alone or shared office space with other lawyers,
but ninety-nine percent of the lawyers practicing in firms with more than ten lawyers were covered).
149. Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Frameworkfor Law Firm Discipline, 16
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 335, 341 (2003) [hereinafter Chambliss & Wilkins, A New Framework].
150. 494 A.2d 801 (N.J. 1985).
151.

Id. at 804.

152.

Id. at 802.
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court had recently revamped its rules of professional conduct to include
New Jersey's Rule 5.1 (a).153 Why, then, was no partner charged?
For one thing, no partner was in charge of Yacovino's cases; he
simply took them over from a lawyer who retired. 154 With no direct
supervisor, no one was accountable for poor direct supervision.15 A
management problem there surely was, but quite possibly a problem for
which no particular partner could fairly be singled out for blame. 156 I
concluded that the prospects for enforcing Rule 5.1(a) against partners
were dim because the rule simply addressed "a partner in a law firm"
and it was widely assumed that this meant "each" partner. The current
Illinois and New Hampshire versions of the Rule confirm this by
referring to "each partner" rather than "a partner."' 1 But either way, it
seemed clear that the Rule would rarely be enforced. Managerial
responsibility would often be too diffuse for disciplinary counsel to
use it.
Struck by the growing complexity of managing modem law firms,
and, more broadly, by the growing use of management systems to
control organizational risks, I became interested around 1990 in the
potential value of lawfirm policies, procedures, and systems, not just to
enhance the efficiency with which work is performed, but also to reduce
the risk of professional misconduct. And I was disappointed by the
paucity of cases in which lawyer-managers were disciplined for Rule
5.1 (a) or 5.3(a) violations. I proposed law firm discipline as a solution in
1991,158 and supported it in another article in 1998."9
My proposal that the courts take disciplinary jurisdiction over law
firms as well as partners for purposes of enforcing Model Rules 5.1(a)
and 5.3(a) has received a mixed reception. On the regulatory front, New
York and New Jersey have provided for law firm discipline, 160 but no

153. Id. at 803-04.
154. Id. at 802.
155.

Id. at804.

156. The court came up with a possible solution twelve years later when it publicly disciplined
a lawfirm for the first time. In re Jacoby & Meyers, 687 A.2d 1007, 1007 (N.J. 1997).

157. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (2010); N.H. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1
(2008). A comment to the New Hampshire rule states that the alteration was not substantive; it was
simply "intended to emphasize that the obligations created by the rule are shared by all the
managers of a law firm and cannot be delegated to one manager by the others." N.H. RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 ethics comm. cmt. (2008) (emphasis added); see also GILLERS ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 334. It seems fatuous to suppose that no partner in, say, a 200-partner law firm may
(a) responsibilities to central management.
delegate Rule 5.1
158. Schneyer, Disciplinefor Law Firms, supranote 25, at 42-45.
159. Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the "Ethical
Infrastructure" of Law Firms, 39 S.TEX. L. REV. 245, 273-75 (1998).
160. See Schneyer, On Further Reflection, supra note 6, at 612-15 & nn.184-209 (citing
authorities).
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other U.S. jurisdiction has followed suit-yet. 16 1 Among the
commentators, several criticize the
proposal, but others, most notably
162
Chambliss, rebut their objections.
In any event, the New Jersey and New York courts have made very
little use of their disciplinary jurisdiction over law firms and have
provided no insight into what would and would not satisfy law firms'or firm managers'-duties under Rules 5.1(a) and 5.3(a). 63 The lesson
here is that, although the diffuseness of partner accountability under
these rules may well undercut disciplinary enforcement against partners,
two more fundamental problems stand in the way of enforcing the Rules
by disciplining firm partners or firms.'64
The first problem is the impracticality of enforcing second-order
rules of ethics in reactive disciplinary proceedings. Disciplinary

161. Massachusetts appears to be on the road to law firm discipline, however. In 2008, the
Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers expressed regret that it lacked authority to discipline "a large
intemational professional corporation" that became embroiled in a conflict because the firm's
"system for detecting conflicts.., was deficient." MASS. BD. OF BAR OVERSEERS, 2008
ADMONITIONS, ADMONITION NO. 08-11 (2008), available at http://www.mass.gov/obebbo/
admon2008.htm. More recently, the state's high court gave notice of a proposed change in Rule 5.1
to provide for law firm discipline and called for comments. See Press Release, Mass. Supreme
Judicial Court, Supreme Judicial Court Standing Advisory Committee Seeks Comment on Proposed
Changes to Rules of Professional Conduct (July 11, 2013) (on file with Hofstra Law Review)
(providing a link to the Committee's Report and Proposals). Moreover, several Canadian provinces
now regulate law firms as well as lawyers, and a recent article strongly advocates a greater focus in
Canada on regulating firms and firm management. See generally Dodek, supra note 21 (suggesting
a "template" for law firm regulation).
162. For a brief discussion of the critics' arguments and responses to them, see Schneyer, On
FurtherReflection, supra note 6, at 617-19 & nn.214-29.
163. Since 1997, law firms have been publicly disciplined in only four New Jersey cases and
one New York case. See id. at 613 & n. 191 (citing cases). And the courts' "analysis" in those cases
is terse and singularly uninformative. Id. at 613.
164. Another important development that has somewhat slaked my interest in law firm
discipline as I first conceived of it is the recognition that much of what I hoped could be
accomplished though disciplinary enforcement against law firms can probably be achieved as easily
and less controversially by focusing law firm responsibility for maintaining appropriate
management systems on one or a few specialists. That strategy is reflected in NSW's PMBR
program, which requires each ILP to designate one or more LPDs to take responsibility for creating
and maintaining such systems. Ironically, the PMBR strategy was developed in large part by legal
ethics scholars in the United States. See Chambliss & Wilkins, A New Framework,supra note 149,
at 342-50; see also Chambliss, supra note 141, at 132-36 (describing the strategy as the
"professionalization of ethics" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
There are other examples of the designation strategy. On the private side, the Attorneys'
Liability Assurance Society, a malpractice insurer for large law firms, requires each firm to
designate a partner as the firm's loss prevention counsel, who, among other things, acts as a liaison
between firm and insurer. See Chambliss, supra note 141, at 130 & n.68. Cf In re Bailey, 821 A.2d
851, 853 (Del. 2003) (holding that "the managing partner of a law firm has enhanced duties, vis-Avis other lawyers and employees of the firm, to ensure the law firm's compliance with its
recordkeeping and tax obligations under the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional Conduct"
(emphasis added)).
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authorities receive many complaints each year. 165 Most are filed by
unsophisticated clients against sole practitioners and small firm lawyers,
complainants who are unlikely to specify any ethics rules as the basis for
their allegations. Instead, disciplinary counsel must consider which
rules, if any, are pertinent when deciding whether and how to investigate
and whether to file charges. It must be extremely rare for complaints to
refer to Rules 5.1 (a) or 5.3(a) or even suggest that broad duties of law66
firm management might be implicated in the complainant's grievance.
Surely, no client who complains that a lawyer missed several hearings in
her case will allege that the lapses were due to an inadequate calendaring
system at the lawyer's firm, though that might be the case.
How, then, do lawyer-managers ever get charged with violating
those second-order rules? Most cases are probably spawned by multiple
complaints against lawyers at a firm which, taken together, suggest that
poor management systems may be implicated and that, without
regulatory intervention, additional complaints are likely. If disciplinary
counsel investigate such a cluster of complaints with Rule 5.1(a) or
5.3(a) in mind, find substantial evidence of infrastructural deficiencies,
and identify appropriate targets, they may file charges. Yet, investigating
such cases, prosecuting them, and negotiating the sorts of corrective
measures that respondents must take are time-intensive. 167 And with few
precedents on the books, outcomes will be uncertain unless violations
are blatant. Moreover, unless proceedings result in public sanctions, the
nature of the management-system deficiencies that were uncovered will
not come to the attention of other firms, limiting the educational value of
the enterprise. In short, disciplinary agencies with tight budgets have
always focused, and will continue to focus, on lawyers who commit
first-order transgressions such as misappropriation of funds or neglecting
client matters.
The second problem that hampers disciplinary enforcement of
provisions like Rule 5. 1(a) against firms (as well as partners) is posed by

165.

See AM. BAR ASS'N STANDING COMM. ON PROF'L DISCIPLINE, 2006 SURVEY ON LAWYER

DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS chart 1 (2007) (reporting that state disciplinary authorities in the United States
received 123,927 complaints in 2006).
166. Who, after all, can be expected to file a complaint alleging violations of these rules?
Those most likely to be aware of inadequate management systems at a firm are lawyers at the firm.
But fear of retaliation against a lawyer who complains to disciplinary authorities about violations of
these rules at his firm makes such complaints extremely unlikely. See Long, supra note 25, at 81213. Alex Long has suggested that disciplinary counsel could make it their policy to "investigat[e]
whether a firm has complied with. .. Rule 5.1 [(a)] every time an ethics complaint against a lawyer
in the firm is filed." Id. at 813 (emphasis added). That, too, seems impractical.
167. In some cases, respondents can be diverted to Law Office Management Assistance
Programs ("LOMAPs") for advice on law office management issues. See Schneyer, On Further
Reflection, supranote 6, at 586-87 & nn.43-44.
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the Rule's "reasonableness" standards. 168 Counsel must show that the
respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm had
measures in place that provide reasonable assurance that firm lawyers
would comply with their ethical obligations. 169 But there is no
authoritative list of the measures firms must have in place. Nor, given
the wide variation in firm size, specialties, clientele, and the like, can
there be. Moreover, the ethical risks that call for "measures," and the
measures they call for, can change rapidly, as is the case today in
managing law firm risks associated with the use of social media, data
storage in "clouds," and other new technologies. This may be why
Professors Geoffrey Hazard and W. William Hodes consider "an entirely
disciplinary
system
for lack
of proper
negligence-based
disciplinary
system
supervision... as inadvisable as a negligence-based
1 70
for isolated instances of malpractice."
These realities explain and justify the flexible reasonableness
standards. Yet, such standards make disciplinary enforcement
problematic. Disciplinary proceedings are sometimes said to be "quasicriminal," 171 which puts a premium on giving lawyers fair notice of the
alleged misconduct. Of course, if the managing partner of a firm made
no effort to have even a minimal conflicts-checking system in place, the
vague "reasonableness" standards in Rule 5.1(a) would pose no obstacle
to discipline. But the uncertain application of those standards in many
potential cases probably makes-and should make--disciplinary
authorities slow to second-guess firm managers. Though the Rule has a
negligence mens rea, disciplinary counsel would ordinarily not file
charges against partners or firms unless there was evidence of knowing
or reckless violations.
At the same time, the reasonableness standards raise the remote but
disturbing possibility that a managing partner might be disciplined for
violating Rules 5.1(a) or 5.3(a) when her firm's procedures failed to
168.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (2012).

169.

See id.

170.

2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 42.6 (3d

ed. 2001 & Supp. 2010). For similar reasons, the Texas Supreme Court opted not to include Model
Rule 5.1(a) in its rules of professional conduct. Instead a comment to Texas Rule 5.01 provides:
Wholly aside from the dictates of these rules for discipline, a lawyer in a position of
authority in a firm... should feel a moral compunction to make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the office, firm, or agency has in effect appropriate procedural measures
giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the [entity] conform to these rules.
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.01 cmt. 6 (2013). Texas also relegates Model

Rule 5.3(a) to a comment. See id. R. 5.02 cmt. 2.
171. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968). In Ruffalo, Justice Byron White took the position
that a federal court "may not deprive an attomey of the opportunity to practice his profession on the
basis of a determination after the fact that conduct is unethical if responsible attorneys would differ
in appraising the propriety of that conduct." Id. at 556 (White, J., concurring).
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prevent lawyer misconduct, even if it was far from clear that the partner
failed to make "reasonable efforts" to ensure that measures were in place
to guard against such misconduct. Disciplining that manager might
amount to making her vicariously172 liable for another lawyer's
misconduct, which would be improper.
At bottom, then, a reactive complaints-based disciplinary system
cannot realistically serve as the regulatory system of choice for
enforcing the broad second-order ethical duties that Rules 5.1 (a) and
5.3(a) impose on management.
C. PSR Appears to Be Evolving in the Directionof
ProactiveRegulation and Adopting PMBR Programs Would Not Be a
Drastic Shift in Philosophy
The proactive element of PMBR, manifested in the self-assessment
process, stands in sharp contrast with the reactive disciplinary process.
Yet it is increasingly consistent with the broader PSR system that is
evolving in the United States. In recent decades, a number of significant
proactive tools have been added to the PSR mix. Mandatory continuing
legal education ("MCLE") is an obvious example, and many MCLE
programs have an ethics component. 173 Some state supreme courts now
require lawyers to answer questions on their annual dues statements or
registration renewal forms which are meant to promote ethics
compliance. 74 Other proactive programs were recommended in 1992 by
a commission that performed what is still the ABA's most forward-

172. See, e.g., In re Galbasini, 786 P.2d 971, 975 (Ariz. 1990) (in banc) (stating that ethics
rules imposing supervisory duties on firm partners establish independent duties for management but
do not authorize the imposition of vicarious discipline for the misconduct of others at the firm). For
a fascinating case in which the founder, manager, and sole principal of a law firm was disciplined
for violating Rules 5.1(a) and 5.3(a), even though respondent argued-not without reason-that he
was instead being disciplined vicariously for improprieties committed by others at the firm, see In
re Phillips, 244 P.3d 549, 557 (Ariz. 2010) (en banc); see also Schneyer, On Further Reflection,
supranote 6, at 597-603 (discussing the case at length).
173. See, e.g., MCLE Requirements, N.Y. CITY B. (2013), http://www.nycbar.org/cle/mclerequirements (listing several states that have an MCLE ethics requirement).
174. For example, the Delaware Supreme Court's Annual Registration Statement instructs
lawyers who are responsible for the maintenance of the firm's financial books and records, such as a
"managing partner," to certify, among other things, that all taxes have been timely filed and paid,
that their firm's trust account is maintained with a financial institution that has agreed to comply
with overdraft notification procedures, that all fiduciary funds held by the firm are maintained in a
trust account in accordance with Rule 1.15(a) of the Delaware Lawyers' Rules of Professional
Conduct, that check register balances for all firm bank accounts are reconciled monthly with bank
statement balances, and that before preparing a Certificate of Compliance they reviewed Rule 1.15.
See generally DEL. SUPREME COURT, ANNUAL REGISTRATION STATEMENT (2000), available at
http://forms.1p.findlaw.com/form/courtforms/state/de/de000001 .pdf.
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looking evaluation of "disciplinary enforcement," an75 evaluation that
went well beyond a review of disciplinary procedures.1
The McKay Commission identified several problem areas in which
disciplinary complaints and harm to clients could be greatly reduced by
proactive regulation. Noting, for example, that in 1989 the bar's client
security funds had received over $72 million in claims for
reimbursement of stolen money, the Commission rejected the traditional
view that disciplinary counsel must show cause to believe that
misconduct has already occurred before counsel may audit lawyers' trust
accounts, and recommended that the courts adopt a rule providing for
random audits. 176 In 1993, the ABA adopted a Model Rule on the
subject, 177 and a number of jurisdictions now conduct random audits,
which are a proven
deterrent to the misuse of client money and property
78
in law practice. 1
D. PSR Should Strengthen Its Commitment to Consumer Protection but
Is Unlikely to Do So Without a PMBR Program to Prevent
UnsatisfactoryProfessionalConduct and Reduce UPC Complaints
A fascinating passage in the Introduction to the McKay
Commission's Report acknowledged the need to expand the regulation
of lawyers to protect the public and assist lawyers. "Times," the
Commission wrote:
have changed. The expectations of the public and the client have
changed. The existing system of regulating the profession is narrowly
focused on violations of professional ethics. It provides no
mechanisms to handle other types of clients' complaints. The system
does not address complaints that the lawyer's service was overpriced
or unreasonably slow. The system does not usually address complaints
of incompetence or negligence .... It does not address complaints that

175.

AM. BAR Ass'N COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, LAWYER

REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY (1992) [hereinafter MCKAY COMM'N REPORT], available at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/resources/report-archive/mckay-re
port.html. This commission is often called the McKay Commission after Robert McKay, its chair
from 1989-1990. Id.
176. Id. at recommendation 16 & cmts. The Commission reported that although a random trust
account audit program in New Jersey "initially was greeted with great suspicion," it was eventually
well accepted and "has educated the legal profession about how to keep proper financial records."
Id.
177. AM. BAR ASs'N, COMPENDIUM OF CLIENT PROTECTION RULES 43-46 (2007).
178. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A
STUDENT'S GUIDE 675 (2012-2013 ed. 2012).
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the lawyer promised services that were not performed or billed for
services that were not authorized.
Some jurisdictions dismiss up to ninety percent of all complaints.
Most are dismissed because the conduct alleged does not violate the
rules of professional conduct. The Commission has gathered much
information about these dismissed complaints. It convinces us that
many of them do state legitimate grounds for client dissatisfaction. The
disciplinary system does not address these tens of thousands of
complaints annually. The public is left with no practical remedy....
The disciplinary process also does nothing to improve the
inadequate legal or office management skills that cause many of these
complaints. Many state bar associations have mandatory continuing
legal education, substance abuse counseling, and other programs.
However, these programs are not coordinated with the disciplinary
process. Lawyers with substandard skills often need more help than
these programs can provide. The judiciary and profession
79 should create
new programs and coordinate all such programs .... 1
This was an unequivocal call to beef up the consumer protection that
PSR affords clients who are the victims or potential victims of what the
Australians call UPC. 80
In a related bow to proactivity, the McKay Commission
recommended that the courts establish a Lawyer Practice Assistance
Committee, both to work with lawyers referred to it by disciplinary
counsel and to work with lawyers who voluntarily seek assistance by,
among other things, reviewing lawyers' offices and "case management
practices., 181 A number of U.S. jurisdictions have implemented this
recommendation, establishing Law Office Management Assistance
Programs ("LOMAPs"). I8 2 LOMAPs generally have two functions. On
one hand, they are tied to the reactive disciplinary process, serving as
diversion programs for lawyers referred by disciplinary counsel after
receiving complaints alleging minor violations that are likely to reflect
deficiencies in office management.1 83 On the other, they "regulate"
proactively by advising lawyers who voluntarily seek their assistance
on such matters as trust accounting, office technology, client

179. McKAY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 175, at intro.; see also id. at recommendation 2
cmts. (stating that "[e]xisting regulation, while generally effective in disciplining serious
misconduct, does not adequately protect the public from lawyer incompetence and neglect. This
failure is having severe repercussions for the legal profession").
180. See supra note 40 (defining UPC).
i81. MCKAY COMM'N REPORT, supra note 175, at recommendation 4.
182. See Schneyer, On FurtherReflection, supra note 6, at 587 n.44 (discussing LOMAPs and
their work).
183. Id.
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relations and marketing,
hiring and training policies, and conflicts
18 4
checking systems.

As things stand, PSR faces two dilemmas in deciding whether it
can and should beef-up the consumer protection it provides to clients.
One way to beef-up would be simply to expand the use of the
disciplinary process to respond to UPC complaints. But the additional
UPC complaints one would expect if such complaints were getting more
serious attention, coupled with the already crushing volume of those
complaints, make this approach impractical and unlikely to gain support.
The more practical approach may be for the courts to establish NSWstyle PMBR programs as a complement to discipline. Doing so could be
expected to cut down substantially on UPC complaints by encouraging
and helping firms to develop and adhere to policies, procedures,
and systems designed to forestall acts and omissions that generate
those complaints.
The second dilemma concerns the decades-long jurisdictional
struggle between the bar, on one hand, and the FTC and various state
consumer protection programs, on the other, concerning the authority to
regulate lawyers' business practices. 185 The bar, of course, prefers that
consumer protection for law clients be the exclusive preserve of the state
supreme courts. But, given the difficulties of relying exclusively on the
reactive disciplinary process to deal with the UPC problem, the state
supreme courts have little choice1 86but to cede more regulatory authority
in this area to external regulators.

184. Id. In their proactive work, LOMAPs compare in some respects with the work of staffers
in the NSW OLSC's Incorporated Legal Practices Unit. But they have no authority to require law
firms to self-assess and report on their management systems. Yet, LOMAPs' staffers often have
expertise in the management of solo practices and small law firms that is likely to correspond to the
expertise of staff members at the NSW OLSC. This suggests that if state supreme courts were to
adopt NSW-style PMBR programs, it would not be difficult to staff them. See id
185. See Middleton, supra note 20, at 1366 (reporting on an ABA and state bar lobbying
campaign to exempt lawyers from regulation under federal consumer protection laws on the ground
that legal ethics rules promulgated by the state supreme courts already regulate lawyers' business
practices); see also Am. Bar Ass'n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 471 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (upholding an ABA
challenge to FTC's position that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 authorized the agency to
regulate law firms as "financial institution[s]" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
186. Compare, e.g., Crowe v. Tull, 126 P.3d 196, 205 (Colo. 2006) (en banc) (holding that
state consumer protection laws apply to lawyers' business practices), with Short v. Demopolis, 691
P.2d 163, 168-69 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (same), and Cripe v. Leiter, 703 N.E.2d 100, 106 (II1.
1998) (continuing to hold that lawyers are exempt from liability under such statutes on the ground
that they cannot have been intended to make lawyer overbilling actionable since the state supreme
courts already regulate lawyers' fees).
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IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article reveals a profound mismatch between the broad ethical
duties of law firm management that the ABA and many state supreme
courts have recognized since the 1980s and the reactive disciplinary
process that PSR relies on to enforce those duties and thereby promote
stronger ethical infrastructures.1 87 The Article explains why there is a
mismatch and why, without reforms, traditional PSR cannot make good
on its commitment to improving law firm management systems for
avoiding lawyer misconduct.1 88 The Article commends NSW-style
PMBR programs as the best road forward, and suggests that courts
which do not wish to go that far for now can still make a start by
adopting or strengthening LOMAPs and requiring law firms to designate
lawyer-managers to file occasional informational reports on the
measures their firm takes to provide reasonable assurance that their
lawyers will fulfill their first-order ethical obligations and their staffs
will conduct themselves in a manner consistent with those obligations. 8 9
The tradition of professional self-regulation for American lawyers
must sometimes yield to new programs if PSR is to be effective. A move
toward proactive, compliance-based regulation as a complement to
reactive disciplinary enforcement of broad duties of law firm
management is a case in point. 9°

187.
188.
189.
190.

See supraPart III.
See supraPart III,
See supraPart II.
See supraPart III.
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